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COMMENTS
EMINENT DOMAIN: THE APPLICATION OF THE
CALIFORNIA COMPATIBILITY REQUIREMENT
TO THE CORPORATE UTILITY CONDEMNOR
The right to take private property for public use, called the power
of eminent domain, is a necessary concomitant of government; the
state possesses this power as an innate sovereign prerogative.' Be-
cause eminent domain is an inherent attribute of sovereignty, consti-
tutional provisions merely limit its exercise.2 Like the police power,
the power of eminent domain antedates the constitution, and although
limited thereby, is not derived therefrom. 3 The only limitations
placed upon the exercise of this sovereign power by the Federal4 and
California 5 Constitutions are that the taking be for a public use and
that just compensation be made.6
The power of eminent domain is bestowed by the people in their
sovereign capacity upon the legislature.7 Pursuant to this mandate,
I Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 719-20, 123 P.2d 505, 510 (1942); People
v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 2d 288, 295, 73 P.2d 1221, 1225 (1937); Gilmer v.
Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229, 249-51 (1861); Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. Los Angeles
Flood Control Dist., 169 Cal. App. 2d 840, 846, 338 P.2d 29, 33 (1959); Univer-
sity of S. Cal. v. Robbins, 1 Cal. App. 2d 523, 525, 37 P.2d 163, 164 (1934).
2 People v. Chevalier, 52 Cal. 2d 299, 304, 340 P.2d 598, 601 (1959);
Anaheim Union High School Dist. v. Vieira, 241 Cal. App. 2d 169, 171, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 94, 95 (1966).
3 United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883); Boom Co. v. Patterson,
98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878); Moran v. Ross, 79 Cal. 159, 160, 21 P. 547, 548 (1889);
see 1 P. NiCHOLs, THE LAw OF EmMMNT DomAiN § 1.14[2] (rev. 3d ed. 1962),
where it is said: "It is an inherent power, necessary to the very existence of
government.... It does not require recognition by constitutional provision,
but exists in absolute and unlimited form. Under this doctrine, therefore,
positive assertion of limitations upon the power is required. This require-
ment is met by the provisions found in most of the state constitutions relating
to the taking of property by eminent domain. Such constitutional provisions
neither directly nor impliedly grant the power to eminent domain, but are
simple limitations upon a power already in existence which would otherwise
be unlimited." (Footnotes omitted).
4 U.S. CoNsT. ameid. XIV, § 1.
5 CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 13-14.
6 People v. Chevalier, 52 Cal. 2d 299, 304, 306-07, 340 P.2d 598, 601, 603
(1959); Anaheim Union High School Dist. v. Vieira, 241 Cal. App. 2d 169, 171,
51 Cal. Rptr. 94, 95-96 (1966); Port San Luis Harbor Dist. v. Port San Luis
Transp. Co., 213 Cal. App. 2d 689, 693, 29 Cal. Rptr. 136, 138 (1936); University
of S. Cal. v. Robbins, 1 Cal. App. 2d 523, 525, 37 P.2d 163, 164 (1934).
7 People v. Olsen, 109 Cal. App. 523, 530, 203 P. 645, 648 (1930).
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the California Legislature in 1872 defined eminent domain as "the
right of the people or government to take private property for public
use."8  In addition to defining the power, the legislature elected to
create two conditions precedent to its exercise, both supplementary to
those imposed by the constitution. First, in addition to the constitu-
tional public use requirement, the legislature provided that it must
appear, before property can be taken, "[t]hat the taking is necessary
to such use."9 Secondly, it was provided, in section 1242 of the Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure, that
[i]n all cases where land is required for public use, the State, or its
agents in charge of such use, may.. . locate the same; but it must be
located in the manner which will be most compatible with the
greatest public good and the least private injury .... 10
The first legislative requisite referred to above is commonly termed
the requirement of necessity. The second requisite will be referred to
henceforth in this comment as the requirement of compatibility.
Since the power of eminent domain has been bestowed upon the
legislative branch, 1 the question as to which persons, entities, and
agencies may exercise it is regulated solely by the legislature.12 Lib-
eral in this respect, the legislature has provided that
[a]ny person may, without further legislative action, acquire private
property for any use specified in Section 1238 of the Code of Civil
Procedure ... by proceedings had under the provisions of Title 7, Part
3, of the Code of Civil Procedure [the Eminent Domain Act] . . . 3
This statute operates to confer upon private individuals' 4 and private
corporations 15 (both hereinafter referred to as "private sector"), as
well as upon agencies of the state (hereinafter referred to as "public
sector"), the power of eminent domain when necessary to appropriate
property for the specified uses. The power so conferred is, of course,
not absolute. In addition to the constitutional prerequisites, its exer-
cise has been pre-conditioned by the legislative requirements of com-
patibility and necessity.
With respect to the requirement of necessity, the apparent intent
of the legislature has been effectuated, for the most part, by the courts.
The burden of proof as to this requirement has been placed upon the
8 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1237.
9 Id. § 1241(2) (emphasis added).
10 Emphasis added. See also id. § 1240(6).
11 People v. Olsen, 109 Cal. App. 523, 530, 203 P. 645, 648 (1930).
12 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1237; see People ex rel. Public Util. Comm'r v.
Fresno, 254 Cal. App. 2d 76, 81, 62 Cal. Rptr. 79, 82 (1967).
13 CAL. CIV. CODE! § 1001 (emphasis added).
14 Linggi v. Garovotti, 45 Cal. 2d 20, 23-24, 286 P.2d 15, 17-18 (1955).
15 Moran v. Ross, 79 Cal. 159, 161-62, 21 P. 547, 548 (1889). Since the
reference in Civil Code section 1001 to "[a]ny person" includes a corporation,
the statute operates to delegate the state's power to condemn to private cor-
porations as well as to individuals and public entities. Los Angeles v. Leavis,
119 Cal. 164, 51 P. 34 (1897); Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 248, 27 P. 604,
606 (1891); St. Helena Water Co. v. Forbes, 62 Cal. 182, 183-84 (1882).
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condemnor,'0 and this burden must be sustained or the condemnation
proceeding will be dismissed.17 The requirement of necessity, as a
condition precedent to the right to take, is thus seen to be both sub-
stantial and bona fide. s
In regard to compatibility, however, the manifested legislative in-
tent has not, in all cases, been so effectuated. The purpose of this
comment, therefore, is to examine the application and operation of
the compatibility requirement, and to examine its efficacy-or lack
thereof-as a condition precedent to the exercise of the power to con-
demn. This examination will be concerned primarily with condemna-
tion proceedings instituted by corporate public utilities. The specific
issue in question is whether the requirement of compatibility, as a
substantial pre-condition to the exercise of the power of eminent do-
main, is, as applied to the public utility condemnor, genuine or illu-
sory.
Legislative and Judicial Background
Statutory Presumptions of Compatibility
Generally, the power to condemn may be exercised directly by the
state through its immediate officers or agents, or may be delegated by
the legislature to public agencies or to members of the private sec-
tor.19 When effecting such delegation, however, the legislature chose
to impose the requirement of compatibility, thus sharply curtailing the
exercise of the power.
A large class of condemnors, however, has received a statutory
exemption from this requirement. Although Code of Civil Procedure
section 1241(2) was, as originally enacted, silent on the subject of
compatibility,20 it was amended in 1913 to give a conclusive presump-
10 Central Pac. Ry. v. Feldman, 152 Cal. 303, 92 P. 849 (1907); Spring
Valley Water Works v. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 528, 28 P. 681 (1891); People v.
Van Gorden, 226 Cal. App. 2d 634, 38 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1964); Carlsbad v. Wight,
221 Cal. App. 2d 756, 23 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1963); Black Rock Placer Mining Dist.
v. Summit Water & Irr. Co., 56 Cal. App. 2d 513, 133 P.2d 58 (1943); Northern
Light & Power Co. v. Stacher, 13 Cal. App. 404, 109 P. 896 (1910); Madera Ry.
v. Raymond Granite Co., 3 Cal. App. 668, 87 P. 27 (1906).
17 Spring Valley Water Works v. San Mateo Water Works, 64 Cal. 123,
28 P. 447 (1883); Carlsbad v. Wight, 221 Cal. App. 2d 756, 34 Cal. Rptr. 820
(1963); People v. O'Connell Bros., 204 Cal. App. 2d 34, 21 Cal. Rptr. 890
(1962). See also Slemons v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 252 Cal. App. 2d 1022,
60 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1967); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lux Land Co., 194 Cal.
App. 2d 472, 14 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1961).
18 Except, of course, where this requirement is conclusively presumed by
statute. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1241(2).
19 Linggi v. Garovotti, 45 Cal. 2d 20, 23-24, 286 P.2d 15, 17-18 (1955);
Moran v. Ross, 79 Cal. 159, 21 P. 547 (1889). "[T]he State may acquire or
authorize others to acquire title ... for public use in the. . [manner] pro-
vided by law." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 184.
20 As originally enacted, in 1872, the section read: "Before property can
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tion of compatibility to certain public sector condemnors-such as the
legislative bodies of cities or counties-respecting property located
within their borders.21 The effect of section 1241(2) as amended is
to make the determination by the official body in question conclusive
on the issue of the compatibility of the location. 22 The precondition of
compatibility, therefore, has been nullified as applied to virtually all
condemnors of a strictly public sector character.
The Private Individual As Condemnor
As above stated,28 the legislature has delegated the state's power
of eminent domain to private individuals as well as to public agencies.
According to the current state of the law, if lack of compatibility is
alleged by the property owner, this is treated as an affirmative de-
fense with the burden of proof on the property owner.24 No statutory
presumptions of compatibility are awarded the private condemnor.
25
be taken, it must appear: 1. That the use to which it is to be applied is a
use authorized by law; 2. That the taking is necessary to such use; 3. If
already appropriated to some public use, that the public use to which it is to
be applied is a more necessary public use."
21 California Code of Civil Procedure section 1241(2), as amended by
Cal. Stats. 1913, ch. 293, § 1, at 549, reads as follows: "[Before property can
be taken, it must appear] 2. That the taking is necessary to such use; pro-
vided, when the legislative body of a county, city and county, or an incorpo-
rated city or town, shall, by resolution or ordinance, adopted by vote of two-
thirds of all its members, have found and determined that the public interest
and necessity require the acquisition, construction or completion, by such
county, city and county, or incorporated city or town, of any proposed public
utility, or any public improvement, and that the property described in such
resolution or ordinance is necessary therefor, such resolution or ordinance
shall be conclusive evidence; [sic] (a) of the public necessity of such pro-
posed public utility or public improvement; (b) that such property is neces-
sary therefor, and (c) that such proposed public utility or public improve-
ment is planned or located in the manner which will be most compatible with
the greatest public good, and the least private injury; provided, that said
resolution or ordinance shall not be such conclusive evidence in the case of
the taking by any county, city and county, or incorporated city or town, of
property located outside of the territorial limits thereof."
Ensuing amendments to section 1241(2) expanded the class of condemnors
afforded the conclusive presumption thereby as follows: Cal. Stats. 1935, ch.
254, § 1, at 930, added sanitary districts, irrigation districts, public utility dis-
tricts, and water districts. Cal. Stats. 1949, ch. 802, § 1, at 1539, added school
districts. Cal. Stats. 1955, ch. 1036, § 3, at 1987, added transit districts. Finally,
Cal. Stats. 1957, ch. 1616, § 1, at 2961, added rapid transit districts.
22 People v. Chevalier, 52 Cal. 2d 299, 304-06, 340 P.2d 598, 601-02 (1959);
Anaheim Union High School Dist. v. Vieira, 241 Cal. App. 2d 169, 51 Cal. Rptr.
94 (1966); see 1 P. NicHoLs, THE LAw oF Ewmn_ Doammw § 4.11 (rev. 3d
ed. 1962).
23 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
24 See text accompanying notes 60-64 infra.
25 Linggi v. Garovotti, 45 Cal. 2d 20, 27, 286 P.2d 15, 20 (1955).
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Nor, as was shown by the Supreme Court of California in Linggi v.
Garovotti,26 has the judiciary seen fit to afford any such presump-
tion to the condemning private individual.
Linggi involved a condemnation proceeding brought by a private
individual seeking to appropriate neighboring land for the purpose of
constructing a sewer for his apartment house. Strictly speaking, com-
patibility was not an issue in the proceeding because the property
owner elected to defend by alleging lack of necessity for the condem-
nation. However, the court did have occasion to mention compat-
ibility, and the decision is illustrative of the attitude of the supreme
court toward private sector condemnors in general. The onus placed
upon such condemnors by the court was expressed as follows:
Upon a trial of the action, it will be necessary for Linggi [the con-
demnor] to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, his right andjustification for the proposed condemnation. A somewhat stronger
showing of those requirements is necessary than if the condemnor
were a public or quasi-public entity. Linggi will not have the benefit
of the conclusive presumption ". . . that such proposed . . . public
improvement is planned or located in the manner which will be most
compatible with the greatest public good and the least private in-
jury." ... He might be denied the easement which he is endeavor-
ing to obtain if other [sic] remedy is available to him which would
be less injurious to private property. 27
Linggi thus stands for the propositions that, in the case of a con-
demnation proceeding brought by a private individual, no presump-
tion of compatibility, conclusive or otherwise, will be afforded the
condemnor, and that the private condemnor must prove his "right
and justification" for the proposed condemnation. The case is also
important, from the standpoint of this comment,28 as a clear example
of recognition by the supreme court of a public sector-private sector
dichotomy in condemnation proceedings.
It would seem, furthermore, based upon Linggi, that in the case
of a condemnation action brought by a private individual, the courts
will effectuate the pre-condition of compatibility as well as that of
necessity. In this specific situation, therefore, it would appear that the
pre-condition of compatibility is in fact genuine and not illusory.
Condemnation and the Utility Condemnor: Statutory Picture
When utilities seek to condemn, as with other private corpora-
tions, they must satisfy both the pre-conditions imposed by the consti-
tution and the requirements of necessity and compatibility imposed
by the legislature.29 In contrast to public sector condemnors, no pre-
sumptions bearing on these requirements have been created by the
26 Id.
27 Td.
28 See text accompanying notes 82-85 infra, where there is a discussion
of the "legitimate" and the "illegitimate" progeny of Pasadena v. Stimson, 91
Cal. 238, 27 P. 604 (1891).
29 See text accompanying notes 4-10 supra.
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legislature for the benefit of the corporate utility condemnor. 30 Thus,
although empowered to exercise the right of eminent domain, the util-
ity condemnor is required by statute to exercise it only "in the man-
ner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good and
the least private injury."3'
In addition to imposing the requirements of necessity and com-
patibility, the legislature also has limited by section 1001 of the Public
Utilities Act, at least in theory, the power of the public utility to con-
demn. This section provides:
No [public utility corporation] shall begin the construction of ...
a line, plant, or system, or of any extension thereof, without having
first obtained from the commission a certificate that the present or
future public convenience and necessity require or will require such
construction.32
The second paragraph of this section, however, excepts therefrom "an
extension within or to territory already served by" the corporation.33
Therefore, the section, to the extent that it purports to operate as a
limitation upon the exercise of the power of eminent domain by the
public utility, is in effect nullified by paragraph two thereof. This is
due to the fact that "territory already served by" the corporation may
amount to as much as one-half or two-thirds of the state.3 4
Looking at the compatibility requirement strictly from the stand-
point of the legislative enactments, then, it appears that a relatively
even balance has been struck between the rights of the property owner
and the property and easement requirements of the utilities. The
utility's side of the scale is occupied by the delegated power of eminent
domain. This is counterbalanced by the property owner's two
weights: the requirements of necessity and of compatibility. The
question remains concerning the role of the courts in the maintenance,
or tipping, of this statutory balance. Curiously, a case35 involving
condemnation by a public sector condemnor has become the corner-
stone of the California rule that determines the compatibility require-
30 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1241(2); cf. Linggi v. Garovotti, 45 Cal. 2d 20,
27, 286 P.2d 15, 20 (1955).
31 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1242.
32 CAL. PUB. UTM. CODE § 1001.
33 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lux Land Co., 194 Cal. App. 2d 472, 479,
14 Cal. Rptr. 899, 903 (1961). Insofar as pertinent, paragraph two of Public
Utilities Code section 1001 reads as follows: "This article shall not be con-
strued to require any such corporation to secure such certificate for an exten-
sion within any city or city and county within which it has theretofore law-
fully commenced operations, or for an extension into territory either within
or without a city or city and county contiguous to its street railroad, or line,
plant, or system, and not theretofore served by a public utility of like char-
acter, or for an extension within or to territory already served by it, neces-
sary in the ordinary course of its business."
34 E.g., the Pacific Gas and Electric Company and the Pacific Telephone
and Telegraph Company.
35 Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 27 P. 604 (1891).
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January 1969) CORPORATE UTILITY CONDEMNORment for corporate utility condemnors. This case, therefore, is the
ment for corporate utility condemnors. This case, therefore, is the
starting point.
Judicial Decision and the Requirement of Compatibility
Pasadena v. Stinson
Stimson was a condemnation proceeding brought under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1237 et seq. (hereinafter referred to as the
Eminent Domain Act) by the City of Pasadena to condemn a right of
way for an outfall sewer. The proceeding was against owners of land
located outside the Pasadena city limits. The defendants moved for a
nonsuit on the ground, inter alia, that the City had failed to show that
the location selected met the compatibility requirement of Code of
Civil Procedure section 1242. The Supreme Court of California held
that "[w] e do not think a failure to prove that the location of the
sewer was most compatible with the greatest public good and least
private injury was ground for a nonsuit.136  The court elected to use
this opportunity to set forth some principles of condemnation law, to-
gether with some cogent reasons therefor:
The state, or its agents in charge of a public use, must necessarily
survey and locate the land to be taken, and are by statute expressly
authorized to do so. (Code Civ. Proc., see. 1242.) Exercising, as they
do, a public function under express statutory authority, it would seem
that in this particular their acts should, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, be presumed correct and lawful .... [F]or certainly it
must be presumed that the state or its agent has made the best choice
for the public, and if this occasions peculiar and unnecessary dam-
age to the owners of the property affected, the proof of such damage
should come from them. And we think that when an attempt is made
to show that the location made is unnecessarily injurious, the proof
ought to be clear and convincing; for otherwise no location could ever
be made. If the first selection made on behalf of the public could be
set aside on slight or doubtful proof, a second selection would be set
aside in the same manner, and so ad infinitum. The improvement
could never be secured, because whatever location was proposed, it
could be defeated by showing another just as good.87
The above language postulates three principles of condemnation
law concerning the requirement of compatibility. First, as it has
power to do,8 the court established a presumption (albeit anomal-
ous 39) that the selection of a location by "[t]he state, or its agents in
charge of a public use should... be presumed correct and lawful. ' 40
30 Id. at 255, 27 P. at 608.
37 Id. at 255-56, 27 P. at 608 (emphasis added).
38 The California Supreme Court's power to create presumptions is ex-
plicitly recognized by the California Evidence Code. Section 600 states that
"[a] presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made
..... " Section 160 states that "'[1]aw' includes . . . decisional law." See
B. WITKXN, CALIFORNIA EVIDEca § 600 (2d ed. 1966).
39 See text accompanying notes 93-102 infra.
40 Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 255, 27 P. 604, 608 (1891).
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Secondly, the court said that if the location selected is unduly injur-
ious to the property owners involved, "the proof of such damage
should come from them"41-that is, the burden of proof as to improper
location is on the property owner. Thirdly, the court established the
principle that the "proof ought to be clear and convincing."42
Before discussing the impact of the Stimson decision upon public
utility condemnation law, several important aspects of the case should
be noted. First, the condemning agency involved was a city; that is,
the condemnation proceeding was strictly a public sector situation.
Secondly, the appeal was based upon the denial of the defendant-
condemnee's motion for a nonsuit.43 In the case of a motion for a
nonsuit on the part of the defendant, it is well established that every
legitimate inference must be given the plaintiff's case.44 The impor-
tance of this fact is that it tends to Weaken the holding of the case as
authority, since the decision was not based upon the merits but upon
the denial of a motion for a nonsuit. Therefore, the plaintiff's case
was given "every legitimate inference."
Lastly, it should be noted that the legislature has recognized and
codified the basic theory behind the Stimson decision-that is, the
theory that public agencies should be presumed to act with the welfare
of the public in mind. This was done when the legislature elected to
amend Code of Civil Procedure section 1241(2), giving a conclusive
presumption of compatibility to certain public agencies.4 5 As noted,
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 246, 27 P. at 605.
44 Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hosp., 47 Cal. 2d 509, 514-15, 305
P.2d 36, 39 (1956); Jefferson v. Hewitt, 103 Cal. 624, 627-28, 37 P. 638, 638-39
(1894). As was said in Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hosp., supra at
514-15, 305 P.2d at 39, "[i]t has long been the rule in this state that a nonsuit
may be granted only when, disregarding conflicting evidence, giving to the
plaintiff's evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled, and indulging
in every legitimate inference which may be drawn from that evidence, the
court properly determines that there is no substantial evidence to support a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff."
45 Cal. Stats. 1913, ch. 293, § 1, at 549 (with respect to property located
within the borders of the agency in question). The Stimson case involved the
condemnation of property located outside the boundaries of the city involved.
Thus the situation there would have fallen outside the purview of section
1241 (2) had it then been enacted. However, the Stimson case was a sewer
line condemnation proceeding. Legislative recognition of the public agency
aspect of the Stimson doctrine is shown by the fact that a conclusive pre-
sumption of compatibility is elsewhere statutorily afforded condemning cities
with respect to extraterritorial sewer line condemnation proceedings. Cali-
fornia Government Code section 39792 provides that "[f]or the purpose of
constructing, equipping, using, maintaining, or operating any facility, the city
may acquire by . . . condemnation . . . any land, rights of way . . . or any
other necessary property, within or without the city or the county where the
city is located." (Emphasis added). Further, it is provided by California
Government Code section 39040 that "[w]hen the public interest or conven-
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the legislature amended this statute in 1935, in 1949, in 1955, and again
in 1957.46 In each case the class of condemnors afforded the conclusive
presumption was expanded-to include additional public agencies. In
addition to cities and counties, for instance, the class now includes
such agencies as school districts, water districts, and rapid transit dis-
tricts. The significance of these enactments is that in no case has the
legislature seen fit to extend the Stimson doctrine to representatives
of the private sector, although repeatedly presented with opportun-
ities to do so. In particular, although public utility districts were
added to the class of condemnors afforded the conclusive presumption
in 1935, in no instance has the legislature seen fit to afford any pre-
sumption, conclusive, rebuttable, or otherwise, to public utility corpor-
ations per se. The fact is, the legislative intent clearly appears to have
been to limit the holders of the presumption of compatibility to those
enumerated by the legislature. And, the line has been drawn at
agencies responsible, in one way or another, to the electorate.
Subsequent Judicial Applications of the Stimson Doctrine
The Presumption of Compatibility
The presumption of compatibility awarded the condemning city
by the court in the Stimson decision has found acceptance in the case
law of the intermediate California appellate courts with respect to
proceedings brought by representatives of both the public and private
sectors. Public sector4 7 decisions citing Stimson as controlling include
Hawthorne v. Peebles,48 Los Altos School District v. Watson,49 Mon-
tebello Unified School District v. Keay,50 and Housing Authority v.
ience requires, a city legislative body may order the acquisition by condem-
nation or purchase of all property, easements, and rights of way, necessary
or convenient for the construction of sewers and drains for sanitary or drain-
age purposes." Finally, it is provided in California Government Code section
39140 that "[piroceedings in the condemnation action shall be had pursuant
to Article 5, Chapter 7, Part 2, Division 3, except that the ordinance of inten-
tion and the ordinance ordering the improvement shall also be conclusive evi-
dence in the action that the location of the proposed improvement is that most
compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury." (Em-
phasis added). It is thus seen that, insofar as cities are concerned, the legis-
lature has codified the Stimson decision with respect to condemnation
proceedings against property both inside and outside of the city limits.
46 See note 21 supra.
47 It is apparent that in each of the cases cited in the text accompanying
notes 48-51 infra the condemning body consisted of a political entity, respon-
sible directly or indirectly to an electorate. Furthermore, with exception to
the Housing Authority case, each of the condemning bodies involved is at the
present time given a conclusive presumption of compatibility. CAL. CODE CIV.
PROC. § 1241(2).
48 166 Cal. App. 2d 758, 333 P.2d 442 (1959).
49 133 Cal. App. 2d 447, 284 P.2d 513 (1955).
50 55 Cal. App. 2d 839, 131 P.2d 384 (1942).
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Forbes.51 In all of these cases, Stimson is cited as authority for the
proposition that the act of the condemning agency in question "in
selecting the particular site herein sought 'should, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, be presumed correct and lawful.' "52
Although denied to a private individual condemnor by the Su-
preme Court of California,5 3 the Stimson presumption of compatibility
has been extended to other members of the private sector-public
utilities-by the California Courts of Appeal in two cases: Tuolumne
Water Power Company v. Frederick54 and San Diego Gas and Electric
Company v. Lux Land Company.55
In Tuolumne Water, the power company brought an action to
condemn a right of way over the defendant's lands for an electric
power line. On appeal, the condemnee took exception to the trial
court's instruction, which, following Stimson, placed the burden of
proof on the issue of compatibility upon the property owner. Since
the Stimson presumption of compatibility was not mentioned in the
specific instruction to which exception was taken, discussion of it was
not necessary to the decision. Iirespective of this fact, the court elec-
ted to extend the Stimson presumption of compatibility to a public
utility corporation. Specifically, quoting from Stimson, the court said
that a location proposed by a public utility condemnor " ' should, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, be presumed correct and lawful.
• . . [F]or certainly it must be presumed that the state or its agent
has made the best choice for the public. . . . -57
Fifty-one years later, in San Diego Gas, the Stimson presumption
was again extended to a public utility condemnor by the California
Court of Appeal. And again, the court, in upholding judgment for the
condemnor, quoted from Stimson5s to overrule the defendant's con-
tention that there had been insufficient showing of compatibility to
comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 1242. The net result of
these two decisions is to afford to the executives (or engineers) of the
51 51 Cal. App. 2d 1, 6-9, 124 P.2d 194, 197-99 (1942).
52 Montebello Unified School Dist. v. Keay, 55 Cal. App. 2d 839, 843, 131
P.2d 384, 387 (1942), quoting from Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 255, 27
P. 604, 608 (1891).
53 Linggi v. Garovotti, 45 Cal. 2d 20, 27, 286 P.2d 15, 20 (1955).
54 13 Cal. App. 498, 110 P. 134 (1910).
55 194 Cal. App. 2d 472, 14 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1961).' Furthermore, the law
upon this point apparently is looked upon by secondary authority as settled.
See, e.g., 1 P. NIcHOLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DomAiN § 411[4] (rev. 3d ed.
1962); Sparrow, Public Use and-Necessity § 8.53, in CAl FORNIA CONDEmNATION
PRACTICE (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar 1960).
56 Tuolumne Water Power Co. v. Frederick, :3 Cal. App. 498, 505, 110 P.
134, 137 (1910). The instruction complained of is set forth verbatim in the
text accompanying note 69 infra.
57 Tuolumne Water Power Co. v. Frederick, 13 Cal. App. 498, 505, 110 P.
134, 137 (1910).
58 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lux Land Co., 194 Cal. App. 2d 472, 477-
78, 14 Cal. Rptr. 899, 902 (1961).
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utility a judicially created presumption that the location they have
selected for their proposed facility satisfies the statutory compat-
ibility requirement.
Burden of Proof: On the Property Owner
The rule in California dealing with the issue of compatibility is
that the burden of proof is on the condemnee. This rule is descendant
from two separate and diverse lines of reasoning and authority. First,
as established in Stimson, if lack of compatibility is put in issue the
state or its agent should be presumed to have made the best choice for
the public.59 This public agency-public responsibility rationale of
Stimson has been applied in an unbroken line of condemnation pro-
ceedings brought by both public agencies 60 and public utility con-
demnors. 61
A second rationale the courts have used to justify placing the bur-
den of proof on the property owner is derived from the rules of plead-
ing and proof. In condemnation proceedings, it is held that the com-
plainant need not plead compliance with Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 1242 in order to state a cause of action.62 If the complaint is silent
on the issue of compatibility, and the defendant does not assert affirm-
atively a failure to satisfy this requirement, no issue of compatibility
is presented. 3 Therefore, if the compatibility of the location is to be
put in issue, it must be pleaded affirmatively by the property owner.
Since the rule is settled in California: that the burden of proof follows
the burden of pleading,6 4 the burden thus falls upon the property
owner to prove that the proposed location fails to meet the compat-
ibility requirement.
59 Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 255, 27 P. 604, 608 (1891).
60 See, e.g., Los Altos School Dist. v. Watson, 133 Cal. App. 2d 447, 284
P.2d 513 (1955); Montebello Unified School Dist. v. Keay, 55 Cal. App. 2d 839,
131 P.2d 384 (1942); Housing Authority v. Forbes, 51 Cal. App. 2d 1, 124 P.2d
194 (1942). See also Sparrow, Public Use and Necessity § 8.56, in CALIFORNIA
CONDEMNATION PRACTICE (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar 1960).
61 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lux Land Co., 194 Cal. App. 2d 472, 14
Cal. Rptr. 899 (1961); Tuolumne Water Power Co. v. Frederick, 13 Cal. App.
498, 110 P. 134 (1910).
62 San Francisco & S.J.V. Ry. v. Leviston, 134 Cal. 412, 66 P. 473 (1910);
Los Altos School Dist. v. Watson, 133 Cal. App. 2d 447, 284 P.2d 513 (1955);
Montebello Unified School Dist. v. Keay, 55 Cal. App. 2d 839, 131 P.2d 384
(1942); People v. Marblehead Land Co., 82 Cal. App. 289, 255 P. 553 (1927);
Vallejo & N. Ry. v. Home Say. Bank, 24 Cal. App. 166, 168-69, 140 P. 974, 975
(1914); see Sparrow, Public Use and Necessity § 8.56, in CALIFOmIA CoNDmW-
NATION PRACTICE (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar 1960).
63 Montebello Unified School Dist. v. Keay, 55 Cal. App. 2d 839, 841, 131
P.2d 384, 386 (1942).
64 "Except as otherwise provided by law, a party has the burden of proof
as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim
for relief or defense that he is asserting." CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 500. In B.
WITuIN, CALIFoRNIA EVIDENCE § 197 (2d ed. 1966), it is said: "Ev. C. § 500 is
Burden of Proof: Clear and Convincing Evidence
As a general rule, in civil cases the "burden of proof" requires
proof "by a preponderance of the evidence." 65 However, a greater
or lesser burden may be imposed by statute or judicial decision.6 6 Ac-
cording to the Stimson doctrine, not only does the condemnee have the
burden of proof on the issue of compatibility, but the condemnee's
proof must be clear and convincing.6 7 The great weight of this bur-
den was emphasized in the California Supreme Court's definition of
the phrase "clear and convincing proof'"-proof "'sufficiently strong
to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.' "68
Tuolumne Water extended the Stimson "clear and convincing" evi-
dence rule to the benefit of a condemning public utility. The court
there stated:
Complaint is made that the court instructed the jury to the effect
that the plaintiff under the law has the right to construct its line in the
manner and place it deems best, provided it uses the most available
route, and provided that the location is made in a manner most com-
patible with the greatest public good and the least private injury; and
that in case it is claimed that the plaintiff has not so located its line,
the proof must be clear and convincing. In our opinion the rule is cor-
rectly stated in the instruction. It is in almost the identical language
used by the Chief Justice in City of Pasadena v. Stimson .... 69
Present State of the Law
With respect to the compatibility requirement, the current Cali-
fornia law, as delineated by the intermediate appellate courts, is as
follows. First, there is a statute which states that land selected for
condemnation "must be located in the manner which will be most
compatible with the greatest public good and the least private
injury., 70 Secondly, in the case of most public sector condemnors,
the requirement of compatibility is conclusively presumed.7 1 Thirdly,
the California Supreme Court has held that in the case of a private
an expanded version of the basic rule that the burden of proof follows the
burden of pleading.
"Where, under the substantive law, the fact is essential to the plaintiff's
claim for relief, the burden of pleading and proof of that fact is on him.
"Where, under the substantive law, the fact is essential to a defense raised
by the defendant, the burden of proof of that fact is on him." (Cited authori-
ties omitted). See also id. § 196.
65 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 115.
66 B. W=xn, CAIzFoRNIA EVIDENCE § 208 (2d ed. 1966).
67 Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 256, 27 P. 604, 608 (1891).
68 Sheehan v. Sullivan, 126 Cal. 189, 193, 58 P. 543, 544 (1899); accord,
In re Jost, 117 Cal. App. 2d 379, 383, 256 P.2d 71, 74 (1953); see B. WIN,
CALIFORmNA EVIDENCE § 209 (2d ed. 1966).
69 Tuolumne Water Power Co. v. Frederick, 13 Cal. App. 498, 505, 110 P.
134, 137 (1910) (emphasis added).
70 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1242.
71 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1241(2).
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condemnor, the condemnor must show his "right and justification for
the proposed condemnation," and "[a] somewhat stronger showing
of those requirements is necessary than if the condemnor were a pub-
lic or quasi-public entity."72 Fourthly, the California Courts of Ap-
peal, following an 1891 decision having nothing to do with public
utilities, have created a presumption that the acts of public utility
executives (and engineers) in selecting land for a proposed facility
are to be "presumed correct and lawful."73 Fifthly, these courts have,
in addition to the creation of this presumption, ruled consistently that
the burden of proof on the issue of compatibility is on the property
owner.7 4 Finally, regardless of whether a condemnation proceeding
is initiated by either a public utility corporation or a governmental
agency, clear and convincing evidence is required for the sustention of
this burden of proof.7 5
Arguments for and Against the Stimson Doctrine as Extended
to Public Utility Condemnors
Arguments in Favor of the Extension
As discussed above,76 the statutory language that property
selected by a public utility must be "located in the manner which will
be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private
injury,"7 7 has been nullified by the California Courts of Appeal.7 8 The
net result of this judicial debilitation of the statutory compatibility
requirement is an elevation of the needs of the utility corporations to
a higher plane than the conflicting rights of the owner of the prop-
erty that the utility seeks to condemn.
Arguments can be advanced in defense of this elevation. The
court in the Stimson case based its holding partially upon the fact
that public improvements necessarily must be located somewhere, and
unless a condemnor is given the benefit of the doubt in the matter
. no location could ever be made. If the first selection made on be-
half of the public could be set aside on slight or doubtful proof, a sec-
ond selection would be set aside in the same manner, and so ad infin-
itum. The improvement could never be secured, because whatever lo-
cation was proposed, it could be defeated by showing another just as
good.7 9
72 Linggi v. Garovotti, 45 Cal. 2d 20, 27, 286 P.2d 15, 20 (1955).
73 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lux Land Co., 194 Cal. App. 2d 472, 477-
78, 14 Cal. Rptr. 899, 902 (1961); Tuoluine Water Power Co. v. Frederick, 13
Cal. App. 498, 505, 110 P. 134, 137 (1910).
74 See text accompanying notes 59-64 supra.
75 Tuolumne Water Power Co. v. Frederick, 13 Cal. App. 498, 505, 110 P.
134, 137 (1910).
70 See text accompanying notes 47-75 supra.
77 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1242.
78 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lux Land Co., 194 Cal. App. 2d 472, 14
Cal. Rptr. 899 (1961); Tuolumne Water Power Co. v. Frederick, 13 Cal. App.
498, 110 P. 134 (1910).
70 Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 256, 27 P. 604, 608 (1891).
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The force of this argument was recognized and applied by the
California Courts of Appeal in the Tuolumne Water and San Diego
Gas decisions. As is the case with the maintenance of adequate city
sewage facilities, the provision of adequate power, heat, and water
services are civic necessities. Private property is going to have to be
acquired, by condemnation or otherwise, simply because transmission
lines and other facilities must be located somewhere if these essential
services are to be provided. This fact is the ultimate justification for
judicial extension of the Stimson doctrine to the benefit of utility
corporations.
Another forceful argument in favor of the extension of the doc-
trine can be made. If the property owner's burden of proof on the
issue of alleged incompatibility were eased, each individual owning
land coincident with the proposed location of the utility facility, or
transmission line, would be placed in a position to exact tribute.80
And the burden of this tribute, if exacted, would fall upon the pub-
lic, as well as upon the utility, in the form of higher rates.
Finally, there is the simple point that someone must ultimately
decide where the utility facilities shall be located. One factor that
must be considered is that of public interest. This, in most cases, sim-
ply involves the selection of the most economic route for the utility.
This factor, however, must be balanced against the factor of private
injury, which, although bound to strike somewhere regardless of the
route selected, is compensable in any event. The problem reduces it-
self to the question of whether the determination of the compatibility
of the location is to be made by the judiciary or by experts in the field
employed by the utility corporation. Is the judiciary equipped to per-
form such a function? Under the Stimson-Tuolumne Water doctrine,
which in effect makes the utility's selection of a location virtually
conclusive except in a clear case of abuse,"' the courts have tacitly
admitted that they are not so equipped and have abandoned the field
to the utility engineers.
Arguments Against the Extension
Legitimate and Illegitimate Progeny of the Stimson Case
A number of arguments may be offered in opposition to the ju-
dicial extension of Stimson. First is the simple fact that the Stimson
case involved a condemnation proceeding initiated by the legislative
80 The primary interest of the typical landowner-condemnee is in the
obtainment of as high a compensation as possible for the taking. Usually,
this compensation will be determined on the basis of an out-of-court settle-
ment with the condenmor. To ease the condemnee's burden of proof on the
issue of compatibility would naturally place him in an immensely stronger
bargaining position in pre-settlement negotiations. Consequently, he would
be able to obtain much higher rates of settlement-"tribute" which he would
be in the position to exact for the use of his land.
81 See text accompanying notes 70-75 supra.
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body of a city. Such a body is elected by and responsible to the people
in a direct fashion. In contrast to the executives and engineers of a
corporate public utility, there is a well-rooted presumption in the
California law that public officers will carry out their functions and
exercise their powers in accordance with the law.8 2
Cases involving condemnation proceedings brought by a member
of the public sector-such as a school district, or a municipal housing
authority-are doubtless legitimate offspring of the Stimson decision.
This is because they are based upon the same principle upon which
Stimson itself was based, i.e., the public responsibility of public
agencies.
Tuolumne Water and San Diego Gas, however, extended the ben-
efit of the Stimson doctrine to members of the private sector. It may
be argued forcefully, therefore, that these cases are illegitimate prog-
eny of the Stimson decision since they fail to recognize the funda-
mental principle upon which Stimson was based. An entity whose
primary responsibility is to its own stockholders cannot be presumed
to have the same notions of the public good as one that is directly
responsible to the public whose interest is being affected. In selecting
a location for a line of high tension transmission towers, for instance,
an electric company has no concern, or at least will not be primarily
concerned, with the blighting effects its towers and lines may have
on the communities through which they are to run. In contrast to
governmental agencies, it is doubtful that any private corporations
exist whose primary object is to promote the public good.8 3 As was
said by one New Jersey court, "'private corporations whose sole ob-
ject it is, to promote the public good ... are not to be found. Private
interest or emolument, is the primum. mobile in all. The public in-
terest is secondary and consequential ,,84 That which is good for the
Tuolumne Water Power Company, therefore, is not necessarily that
which is good for the country.
Moreover, public utilities, although executers of essential public
functions, are not in the same public sector category as governmental
agencies, such as those typified by the condemnors in the above dis-
cussed legitimate progeny of the Stimson decision.8 5 The Stimson
82 People v. Glove Grain & Milling Co., 211 Cal. 121, 294 P. 3 (1930);
Housing Authority v. Forbes, 51 Cal. App. 2d 1, 124 P.2d 194 (1942); see CAL.
EVIDENCE CODE § 664 ("It is presumed that official duty has been regularly
performed.").
83 Fortenberry, Exercise of Eminent Domain by Private Bodies for Public
Purpose, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 131, 133.
84 Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Snelbaker, 30 N.J. Super. 171, 177, 103 A.2d 634,
638 (Super. Ct. 1954) (emphasis by the court), quoting from Scudder v.
Trenton Del. Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694, 726-27 (Chancery 1832).
85 In addition to its obvious character, this distinction has received statu-
tory recognition. It is explicitly provided that where property has been
appropriated "by any individual, firm, or private corporation" to some public
use, and the same property is needed by a public agency for a public use, the
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doctrine was originally formulated to expedite condemnation proceed-
ings brought by a governmental body. The fact that utilities are es-
sentially members of the private sector is the ultimate objection to
the extension of the Stimson doctrine to the corporate utility con-
demnor.
The Doctrine of Delegation
Certain rules of statutory construction supply additional argu-
ments against the extension of the Stimson doctrine to the utility
condemnor. It is fundamental that statutes for the condemnation of
land are in derogation of general rights and of common law modes of
procedure, and must be strictly construed.86 According to the doctrine
of delegation, eminent domain is an inherent power of the sovereign,
which, when delegated, can be exercised only in strict accordance with
explicit legislative authorization.87 California Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 1237 expressly limits the exercise of the power of eminent
domain to "the manner provided in this title." As stated by one court:
A grant of the power of eminent domain, which is one of the at-
tributes of sovereignty most fraught with the possibility of abuse and
injustice, will never pass by implication, and when the power is
granted, the extent to which it may be exercised is limited to the ex-
press terms or clear implication of the statute in which the grant is
contained.88
Therefore, it well may be argued that when the legislature dele-
gated the power of eminent domain to members of the private sector
it had no intent to afford those members any presumption concerning
latter use "shall be deemed a more necessary use to which such property has
been appropriated." CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1241(3); see People ex rel. Pub-
lic Util. Comm'r v. Fresno, 254 Cal. App. 2d 76, 81-82, 62 Cal. Rptr. 79, 82-83
(1967), where it is said: "Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1240, it is
clear that a city may, by condemnation, take property already appropriated
to a public use if the public use to which it is to be applied is a more neces-
sary public use. Moreover, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1241 a city
is expressly authorized to condemn property belonging to a public utility al-
ready dedicated to a public use. In addition, the proposed city use is deemed
a 'more necessary public use' as a matter of law." (Emphasis added).
86 San Francisco & Alameda Water Co. v. Alameda Water Co., 36 Cal. 639
(1869); Gilmer v. Lime Point, 19 Cal. 47 (1861).
87 People v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 2d 288, 73 P.2d 1221 (1937); Ventura
County v. Thomson, 51 Cal. 577 (1877); Los Angeles v. Hall, 103 Cal. App. 460,
284 P. 707 (1930); see McCarty v. Southern Pac. Co., 148 Cal. 211, 82 P. 615
(1905); San Francisco & Alameda Water Co. v. Alameda Water Co., 36 Cal.
629 (1869); Stanford v. Worn, 27 Cal. 171 (1865); Curran v. Shattuck, 24 Cal.
427 (1864). See also Delaware L. & W.R.R. v. Morristown, 276 U.S. 182 (1928);
Bensley v. Mountain Lake Water Co., 13 Cal. 306 (1859), where it was held
that he who relies for title on the power of the state to condemn, and not on
the will of the owner, must show strict compliance with those statutory rules
from which his title accrues.
88 Los Angeles v. Koyer, 48 Cal. App. 720, 725, 192 P. 301, 303 (1920),
quoting from 10 Ru~nio CASE LAW 196.
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compatibility. Further, although the burden of proof concerning
noncompatibility is on the property owner, in no instance has the
legislature manifested any intent that this burden should require a
sustention by "clear and convincing" evidence.
Thus, based upon the doctrine of strict construction, it is possible
to conclude that the California Courts of Appeal overstepped their
bounds in electing to extend the rule of the Stimson case to members
of the private sector. This conclusion follows from the fact that the
statute that delegates the state's power of eminent domain to mem-
bers of the private sector8 9 is limited by another statute that quite
clearly pre-conditions the exercise of this power. This limiting statute
states succinctly and unequivocally that the property to be condemned
must be located "in the manner which will be most compatible with
the greatest public good and the least private injury."9 0 Legislative
intent to abrogate this requirement, respecting its application to the
corporate utility condemnor, is not discernible from an examination of
the enactments on the subject.
Presumptions: The Manifested Legislative Intent
A further objection to the extension of the Stimson doctrine to
utility corporations can be based upon the manifested legislative in-
tent regarding presumptions of compatibility. It clearly may be
argued that the legislature has expressed an intent on this issue by its
decision to limit holders of presumptions of compatibility to govern-
mental agencies such as those enumerated in Code of Civil Procedure
section 1241(2) .91
No statute authorizes the courts to expand this class. Code of
Civil Procedure section 1858 provides that in the construction of a
statute the function of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare
what is in terms or substance contained therein, not to insert what
has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted. The function of
the court is not to rewrite the law so as to make it conform to a pre-
sumed intent not expressed therein.9 2 Based upon a simple reading
of the Eminent Domain Act, minus the judicial gloss, it is quite ap-
parent that the legislative intent was to limit holders of conclusive
presumptions of compatibility to governmental agencies that are re-
sponsible, directly or indirectly, to the electorate. If this interpreta-
tion of the legislative intent is correct, then the California Courts of
Appeal are in error. In effect, they have ignored the mandate of
Code of Civil Procedure section 1242 in awarding a virtually insur-
mountable presumption-burden of proof combination to corporate
utility condemnors respecting the requirement of compatibility.
89 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1001.
90 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1242.
91 Said governmental agencies are listed in note 21 supra.
92 Seaboard Acceptance Corp. v. Shay, 214 Cal. 361, 365, 5 P.2d 882, 884
(1931); People v. White, 122 Cal. App. 2d 551, 554, 265 P.2d 115, 117 (1954).
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The Anomalous Nature of the Stimson Presumption
A further argument that can be used effectively against the Stim-
son doctrine results from the nature of the Stimson presumption it-
self. The Stimson case established a presumption that the acts of the
condemnor in selecting land for condemnation should be presumed
to be "correct and lawful," i.e., in accord with the requirement of com-
patibility.93 Yet, as above noted,94 the party against whom the pre-
sumption operates already has the burden of proof with respect to
this issue. A genuine presumption operates in favor of one upon
whom the burden of proof is placed.95 Its function is to shift the bur-
den of proof to the party against whom the presumption operates.9 6
A presumption operating against the party having the burden of proof
serves no function, and is, therefore, anomalous.97 Such a presump-
tion is redundant, since it merely restates the already existing burden
of proof on the given issue.98
Such a presumption is valueless and illogical. It has been char-
acterized as "like a handkerchief thrown over something covered by
a blanket,"'9 9 so wholly overshadowed by the burden of proof as to be
without practical effect.10 0 As stated by Chief Justice Traynor:
[I]t is clear that a rebuttable presumption is only a procedural device
to aid the party with the burden of proof. It would be meaningless
if applied against him because he already has the greater burden of
introducing sufficient evidence to prove the existence of the facts by
the preponderance of the probabilities.101
This viewpoint of Chief Justice Traynor has apparently been
adopted by the California Evidence Code. As stated in the official
comment to Evidence Code section 606:
If the party against whom the presumption operates already has
the same burden of proof as to the nonexistence of the presumed fact
that is assigned by the presumption, the presumption can have no ef-
fect on the case and no instruction in regard to the presumption should
be given.
It is thus predictable that the policy of awarding this anoma-
lous presumption of compatibility to a condemning utility will be re-
93 See text accompanying notes 47-58 supra.
94 See text accompanying notes 59-64 supra.
95 Falknor, Notes on Presumptions, 15 WASH. L. REv. 71, 82 (1940).
96 CAL. EVIDENcE CODE § 606.
97 Falknor, Notes on Presumptions, 15 WASH. L. REv. 71, 82 (1940); see
60 MicH. L. REV. 510, 511 (1962).
98 60 McIC. L. REV. 510, 511 (1962).
99 Brown v. Henderson, 285 Mass. 192, 196, 189 N.E. 41, 43 (1934) (con-
curring opinion).
100 60 Mi ci. L. REV. 510, 511 (1962); see Board of Water Comm'rs v. Rob-
bins, 82 Conn. 623, 640, 74 A. 938, 945 (1910).
101 Speck v. Sparver, 20 Cal. 2d 585, 593, 128 P.2d 16, 20 (1942) (dissent-
ing opinion) (emphasis added); accord, Scott v. Burke, 39 Cal. 2d 388, 402,
247 P.2d 313, 321 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
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examined upon a presentation of a proper case to the Supreme Court
of California. 02
The Illogicality of the Clear and Convincing Requirement
The policy requiring the property owner to demonstrate lack of
compatibility by "clear and convincing" evidence is susceptible to
serious question. The San Diego Gas case stands as recent authority
for extension of the anomalous Stimson presumption to utilities, and
also for placing the burden of proof on the condemnee. 10 3 It is sig-
nificant to note, however, that this latter case, although it quoted
Stimson with approval, quoted only part of the Stimson rule. 04 Omit-
ted was the sentence imposing the extraordinary burden of "clear and
convincing" evidence upon the property owner, despite the existing
precedence of Tuolumne Water'0 5 for the imposition of such a burden.
Upon analysis, the illogicality of imposing such an extraordinary
burden upon the property owner is evident. This illogicality is demon-
strated by the fact that the clear and convincing evidence rule gives
the public utility condemnor a greater advantage over a contesting
property owner than is afforded to some public agencies.
For example, California Public Resources Code section 5006.1 pro-
vides that the declaration of the Director of Parks and Recreation shall
be prima facie evidence of compatability10 6 And, according to the
Evidence Code, "[a] statute providing that a fact or group of facts is
102 A conclusive presumption of compatibility, such as that afforded con-
dening public agencies in California Code of Civil Procedure section 1241(2),
also operates against the party having the burden of proof on the issue. Such
a presumption, however, cannot be classified as anomalous, since rather than
a mere procedural device, a conclusive presumption is the equivalent of a
substantive rule of law. See 9 J. WIGOMRE, EviENCE § 2492 (3d ed. 1940).
Being in effect a substantive rule of law, such a presumption, rather than
merely shifting the burden of proof on the given issue, operates to obliterate
it entirely, since if the presumption applies, compatibility is no longer an
issue in the proceeding.
103 San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lux Land Co., 194 Cal. App. 2d 472, 477-
78, 14 Cal. Rptr. 899, 902 (1961).
104 Id. Quoting from Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 255, 27 P. 604, 608
(1891), the court said: "'. . . [I]t must be presumed that the state or its
agent has made the best choice for the public, and if this occasions peculiar
and unnecessary damage to the owners of the property affected, the proof of
such damages should come from them.'" In Stimson, the court went on to
say: "[W]e think that when an attempt is made to show that the location
made is unnecessarily injurious, the proof ought to be clear and convincing
." Pasadena v. Stimson, supra.
105 Tuolumne Water Power Co. v. Frederick, 13 Cal. App. 498, 505, 110 P.
134, 137 (1910).
106 "The declaration of the director shall be prima facie evidence ...
[t]hat such proposed acquisition is planned or located in a manner which will
be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury."
CAL. PUB. RESOURCES CODE § 5006.1.
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prima facie evidence of another fact establishes a rebuttable presump-
tion."'10 7 As clearly can be inferred from the court's holding in People
v. Van Gorden,08 clear and convincing evidence is not required to
rebut this presumption. Van Gorden involved a proceeding to con-
demn land for park purposes pursuant to Public Resources Code sec-
tion 5006.1. As was said by the court, the Director's resolution "suf-
fices for proof of a particular fact until contradicted and overcome
... by other evidence, direct or indirect."'x0 9  In other words, the
legislature has provided that the prima facie case established by an
appointed public official's resolution of compatibility may be overcome
by a mere preponderance of the evidence.110 Contrast this with the
presumption-burden of proof combination given by the judiciary to
the operating executives of a utility corporation-a combination which
can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence."'
The property owner's burden of proving lack of compatibility by
clear and convincing evidence may be further contrasted with the
property owner's burden of proof in a "public use" controversy.
"Public use," as already noted,1 12 is a constitutionally justiciable issue
in every eminent domain proceeding. However, in a proceeding to
condemn land for state highway purposes, 113 it was held that the
public use requirement was prima facie established by the Highway
Commission's resolution, which created a rebuttable presumption of
public use. It was held by the court that this presumption need only
be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. The court stated:
In the case at bench we thus have a prima facie case established
by plaintiff [Highway Commission] that the taking of the entire par-
107 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 602.
108 226 Cal. App. 2d 634, 33 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1964).
109 Id. at 636-37, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 267, quoting from 18 CAL. JUR. 2D Evi-
dence § 13 (1954).
110 It is only necessary to introduce sufficient evidence to rebut the prima
facie case established by the director's resolution. No more is required. See
Frank Meline Co. v. Kleiberger, 108 Cal. App. 60, 62-63, 290 P. 1042, 1043
(1930), where it is said, "It seems settled ... that a prima facie case is
that which is received or continues until the contrary is shown. A prima
facie case is one which . . . can be overthrown . . . by rebutting evidence
adduced on the other side." See also Huber v. Scott, 122 Cal. App. 334, 342,
10 P.2d 150, 153 (1932), where it is said, "Prima facie evidence is a well-
recognized term which infers that it is only controlling in the absence of other
evidence which rebuts [it]." Accord, Maganini v. Quinn, 99 Cal. App. 2d 1,
8, 221 P.2d 241, 245 (1930); People v. Carmona, 80 Cal. App. 159, 166, 251 P.
315, 318 (1926).
"I1 And this disparity is in full view of the fact that in the case of a
governmental body, such as the Department of Parks and Recreation, there is
an established presumption, noted in text accompanying note 82 supra, that
public officers will carry out their functions and exercise their powers in
accordance with the law.
112 See text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
113 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Lagiss, 223 Cal. App. 2d
23, 35 Cal. Rptr. 554 (1963).
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cel in question was for a public use. It was therefore incumbent upon
defendant to overcome this prima facie showing by establishing...
his affirmative defenses .. . by a preponderance of the evidence, the
burden of proof as to such defenses being on him.11 4
Contrast, again, this with the presumption-burden of proof combina-
tion afforded to utility executives respecting compatibility-one that
the condemnee can only overcome with clear and convincing evidence.
As is apparent, serious question exists concerning the policy of
requiring the property owner to prove noncompatibility by clear and
convincing evidence. This policy operates as a de facto judicial nulli-
fication of the express compatibility requirement of Code of Civil
Procedure section 1242. Legitimate doubt exists as to whether a doc-
trine based upon a condemnation proceeding by a city, and formulated
on the basic assumption of the public responsibility of public agen-
cies,:1 should be extended to the benefit of corporate public utilities.
Consequently, it may be expected that this policy of requiring clear
and convincing proof from the landowner on the issue of compatibility
will also be extensively re-examined upon the presentation of an ap-
propriate case to the Supreme Court of California.
The Illinois Practice
There is one feasible method of solving the problem of striking a
balance between the needs of the vast public utilities and the rights of
the owners of private property, while still maintaining an element of
control over potential abuse. This is for the legislature to condition
the exercise of the utility's power to condemn upon the prior approval
of another body of a more public character than the utility." 6
For example, under the Illinois Public Utilities Act, utilities are
authorized to exercise the power to condemn, but only when the pro-
ject requiring condemnation is authorized by the Illinois Commerce
Commission." 7 A public utility, having thus acquired the power of
eminent domain, is given approved termini between which it may
choose the particular parcels of land that will be crossed by the im-
provement. These termini are usually specified by the certificate of
public convenience and necessity that is issued by the state regula-
tory body."8 Accordingly, the exercise of the power of eminent do-
main requires the joint operation of the Illinois Commerce Commis-
sion and the petitioning public utility. This joint operation is a neces-
sary pre-condition to the vesting in the utility of the power of eminent
domain, and the power to select the route of a facility." 9 Under this
114 Id. at 37, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 563 (emphasis added).
"5 Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238, 255-56, 27 P. 604, 608 (1891).
116 Costello, Challenging the Right to Condemn, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 52, 61.
117 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, §§ 50, 63 (1963).
118 Fortenberry, Exercise of Eminent Domain by Private Bodies for Public
Purpose, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 131, 149.
119 Central Ill. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Schully, 17 M11. 2d 348, 351-52, 161 N.E.
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Act, the power to condemn does not even exist in the utility until the
Commission issues its certificate, having found that the public con-
venience and necessity require the facility along the route selected by
the utility.120
The net effect of the Act is to subject the utility's exercise of the
condemnation power to the scrutiny of a regulatory body, while
leaving most of the operating decisions in the hands of the utility.
The Illinois practice is thus quite distinguishable from the California
practice, in which the only practical control of a utility's exercise of
the power of eminent domain is wielded by the courts. 121 As dis-
cussed above, the courts have, de facto, relinquished this control over
the utilities by affording them, respecting compatibility, a presump-
tion cum burden of proof package that is merely a scintilla less than
conclusive.
Suggested California Procedure
By virtue of Code of Civil Procedure section 1242, the California
legislature has delegated the essentially non-judicial function of arbi-
trating questions of compatibility to the judiciary. Unfortunately, a
court is ill-suited to determine whether a hundred-mile line of fifty-
foot high transmission towers has been located "in the manner which
will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least
private injury.'1 22 While the judiciary's lack of expertise in this field
is apparent, it is also apparent that the problem should not be aban-
doned to "the eager slide rule of the engineer-architect and the arbi-
trary decision"'123 of the executives of essentially private corpora-
tions. The power of eminent domain is too "fraught with the pos.-
sibiity of abuse"'1 4 to leave the manner of its exercise to the virtually
unfettered discretion of the corporate utility condemnor.
2d 304, 307 (1959); Fortenberry, Exercise of Eminent Domain by Private
Bodies for Public Purpose, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 131, 150.
120 See Central ll. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Schully, 17 Ill. 2d 348, 351-52, 161
N.E.2d 304, 307 (1959), where the court states: "We have found that it
requires the concurrent action of the petitioning public utility and the Com-
merce Commission to vest the power of eminent domain and the selection of
the route for a power transmission line in the corporate public utility. The
necessity for the improvement requiring condemnation and the manner of its
construction are for the consideration of the condemnor, subject to the deci-
sion of the commission as to convenience and necessity. The condemning
petitioner does not have the right of eminent domain until the commission
issues its certificate."
121 See discussion of California Public Utilities Code section 1001 in text
accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
122 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1242.
123 State H'way Comm'n v. Wheeler, 148 Mont. 246, 253, 419 P.2d 492, 496
(1966).
124 Los Angeles v. Koyer, 48 Cal. App. 720, 725, 192 P. 301, 303 (1920),
quoting from 10 RuwrXG CAsE LAw 196.
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What is needed in California is a system similar to the Illinois
practice. This would require the concurrence of an agency of the
public sector as an essential pre-condition to the vesting and exercise
of the power of eminent domain by a private corporation. An initial
check would thereby be provided on possible abuses of the power by
the corporation. And, the property owner would still have an ulti-
mate recourse to the courts, which would need to act only in clear
cases of abuse.
The Public Utilities Commission, as constructed by the California
Constitution,'125 is both authorized and specially equipped to handle
problems such as evaluating the compatibility of locations proposed
by utility condemnors for the placement of their facilities. As stated
in the California Constitution:
The [Public Utilities] Commission shall have and exercise such power
and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate public utilities... as shall
be conferred upon it by the Legislature, and the right of the Legis-
lature to confer powers upon the [Public Utilities] Commission re-
specting public utilities is hereby declared to be plenary and to be
unlimited by any provision of this Constitution.126
Interpreting this provision, it was stated by one court:
[I]t will not be questioned that the legislature in the exercise of the
power conferred upon it by [the California Constitution] may right-
fully invest the [Public Utilities] Commission with plenary power to
regulate the manner in which.. . public utilities shall maintain and
conduct their business and the essential appliances thereof and that
said commission may prescribe such regulations with respect to the
carrying on of such utilities as may be necessary to safeguard and
protect any rights of the public which may be affected thereby.12 7
Thus, California has a constitutionally constructed and authorized
public agency with the express function of regulating and exercising
control over utility corporations. However, as above noted,128 the
Public Utilities Act, in its present form, exempts utilities from Com-
mission control in the case of construction or extension of company
facilities into or to areas already served by them. If this exemption
were abolished, it would be necessary for the utility to secure a cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity as a pre-condition to the
exercise of the power of eminent domain.129 The Commission would
thus have an opportunity to assess the compatibility of the utility's
proposed location prior to the issuance of its certificate. The legis-
lature, having constitutional authority, s0 could readily establish ad-
ministrative machinery designed to provide the property owner with
125 CAL. CoNsT. art. XII, §§ 22, 23.
126 Id. § 23 (emphasis added).
127 Morris v. Sierra Power Co., 57 Cal. App. 281, 289, 207 P. 262, 265 (1922)
(emphasis added); accord, Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640,
137 P. 1119 (1913).
128 See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
129 The issuance of the certificate would be contingent, inter alia, upon
the compatibility of the proposed location.
130 See text accompanying notes 125-127 supra.
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an opportunity to be heard before the Commission, prior to the issu-
ance of the certificate. And, since the exercise of the power to con-
demn by the utility would thus be preliminarily regulated by a gov-
ernmental body, it would be reasonable to provide, by statute, that
the selection made by the utility would be presumed to comply with
the compatibility requirement, and that the presumption could be
rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence. The utility would
still be able, therefore, to effect an economic land acquisition scheme,
providing the state with power, water, and other necessary services at
economically feasible rates. The rights of the property owner, how-
ever, would be better protected with the supervision of the utility by
a regulatory governmental agency. And the ultimate right of the
property owner to be secure from an arbitrary or abusive taking of
his property would be protected by his right of recourse to the
courts.
1 31
Conclusion
Land development in California has greatly increased in the
three-quarters of a century since the Stimson doctrine was formu-
lated. What was in 1891 a largely agrarian state has been trans-
formed into a series of vast urban and suburban sprawls. What was
grazing land or desert in 1891 is now premium acreage vital to grow-
ing metropolitan areas. Along with this growth in population and
land use has come the growth of enormous private corporations to
fill the needs of the public for power, water, and other services. The
requirements of these corporations for land and easement rights has
increased proportionately with the development of the state's lands
and the increase of the state's population density. Also increasing
proportionately with the development of the state's land is the ca-
pacity of the corporate public utility to do damage by the indiscrim-
inate blighting of large areas by overland high power transmission
towers or other utility facilities. It thus becomes more and more
important that the property selected by public utility condemnors
actually be the most compatible with the greatest public good and the
least private injury. Perhaps interjecting an element of control by
the Public Utilities Commission over the selection and location of
131 Under present law, no court other than the California Supreme Court
has jurisdiction to review, correct, or reverse a decision or order of the Public
Utilities Commission. CAL. PUB. UTn. CoDE § 1756; see Pacific Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v; Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 137 P. 1119 (1913). Continuation of
this rule would of course operate to circumscribe drastically the property
owner's chances of receiving judicial review of the Commission's determina-
tion of cdmpatilility. Howev~er, as above noted, the authority of the Califor-
nia legislature over the Public Utilities Commission is plenary. CAL. CoNsT.
art. XII, § 23. The legislature could therefore provide for review of the Com-
mission's initial determination of compatibility at a lower judicial level, pref-
erably in the superior court. Such a change would be desirable and neces-
sary in order to protect the property owner's right to ultimate recourse to the
courts, with respect to the issue of compatibility.
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public utility routes and facilities may provide a solution. Few will
dispute that expert help is needed. Others may argue that further
proliferation of administrative bureaucracy is too high a price to pay
for the value received in this case. These, of course, are legislative
questions.
But the issue of compatibility also poses a question for the courts.
This is whether they will accept the role assigned to them by Code of
Civil Procedure section 1242-and arbitrate the issue of compatibility
-or whether they will refuse such a role and continue to follow the
rules laid down in Stimsorn, which bear only upon the right of a city to
condemn. It has been suggested that the courts are not well-equipped
to function in such fashion, and that there may exist better meth-
ods of selecting routes for utility lines than that of passing the ulti-
mate decision concerning their location to the judiciary. However,
until the legislature sees fit to establish new methods, Code of Civil
Procedure section 1242 places the burden of determining whether or
not the location is most compatible with the greatest public good and
the least private injury squarely on the courts. Hopefully, the ju-
dicial policy of deferring this question to the judgment of the utility
condemnor, on the basis of principles formulated in Pasadena v. Stim-
son, will be re-examined.
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